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Following the recent escalation between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the conflict over
Nagorno-Karabakh, multiplying voices note that Turkey, Azerbaijan’s closest ally,
has been sending not only its military but also Syrian mercenaries to fight at the
frontline against Armenia (see here, here, here, and here) – an allegation which both
Turkey and Azerbaijan have denied (see here). Notwithstanding the fact that many
States have condemned this intervention and urged Turkey to stay out of the conflict
(see here and here), this post examines the question of whether there could be a
legal ground for Turkey’s actions.
The conflict about Nagorno-Karabakh
Nagorno-Karabakh is a disputed area on the territory of Azerbaijan currently under
the effective military control of Armenia. After a full-fledged war between 1991 and
1994, Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a cease-fire (see here). Since then, the OSCE
Minsk Group initiated several attempts in order to reach a peaceful solution to this
conflict. However, none of these attempts was successful. To the contrary, multiple
violations of the cease-fire took place since 1994, most recently in 2016.
On 27 September 2020, both parties resumed hostilities. Armenia, being the first to
declare war (see here), reported that the hostilities began as Azerbaijan launched
an attack against military positions of Armenia. Azerbaijan on the other hand stated
it merely responded to Armenia shelling its army positions and settlements along
the entire front line (see here). The fighting continued until 10 October, when a
second cease-fire signed by Armenia and Azerbaijan came into effect (see here).
After multiple reports of cease-fire violations on both sides (see here and here),
the United States, Armenia, and Azerbaijan released a joint statement, announcing
another cease-fire taking effect on 26 October (see here). Again, reports of cease-
fire violations emerged just minutes after the agreement came into effect (see here).
Prior to the resumption of hostilities on 27 September, allegations arose that
hundreds of Syrian fighters recruited by Turkey were transferred to Azerbaijan (see
e.g. here), while Turkish officials stated that Turkey would support Azerbaijan’s
right to self-defence (see here and here). As Turkey is not a belligerent party in the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the only possible ground of justification for its alleged
interference is the one of collective self-defence.
Collective self-defence: looking back at Nicaragua
The “inherent” right to collective self-defence is recognized in Article 51 UN Charter
as well as customary international law. The question was most famously dealt
with by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its 1986 Military and Paramilitary
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Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua) decision. The United States argued
that their actions carried out on behalf of El Salvador, Honduras and, Costa Rica
against Nicaragua were justified on the ground of collective self-defence. The ICJ
ultimately decided against the US: it did not find an armed attack by Nicaragua that
could have triggered such a right to self-defence.
In Nicaragua, the Court identified three requirements for the existence of a right
to collective self-defence. First, there must be an armed attack against a member
State. Second, the State under said attack must declare to be the victim of an
armed attack and, third, request the help of another State. The additional criteria of
necessity, proportionality, and of a reporting obligation to the Security Council do
not determine the existence of a right to self-defence, but rather whether the act of
self-defence was carried out in accordance with international law. Non-compliance
with one of the latter criteria would, therefore, constitute an additional ground of
wrongfulness.
Does Turkey meet the criteria set out in Nicaragua?
When determining the existence of an armed attack against Azerbaijan, the first
problem arising is one of evidence. While there is evidence that both States
launched attacks against one another, both Armenia and Azerbaijan blame the other
party for initiating the conflict. As argued on this blog before (see here), none of
the incidents in late September were able to meet the high threshold of an armed
attack, although by now, the ICJ’s “scale and effect” threshold (see here at 195)
might arguably have been met. Alternatively, one could argue that, by occupying
the Nagorno-Karabakh region and by continuously violating Azerbaijan’s territorial
integrity, Armenia is still conducting an armed attack today. Indeed, the military
occupation of another State’s territory is considered an act of aggression under
customary international law, reflected in General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX).
Additionally, the Security Council issued four resolutions (see here, here, here and
here) reaffirming the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and demanding the immediate
withdrawal of Armenia from all occupied areas of Azerbaijan. Hence, an armed
attack is arguably (still) present.
Additionally, for the existence of a right to collective self-defence, a declaration
and request by Azerbaijan, asking Turkey for aid in exercising the right to self-
defence, is also required. As the ICJ emphasized in Nicaragua, “there is no rule in
customary international law permitting another State to exercise the right of collective
self-defence on the basis of its own assessment of the situation.” Azerbaijan, in
multiple letters addressed to the UN Secretary-General, declared it was under an
armed attack by Armenia and invoked self-defence (see here and here). Moreover,
Azerbaijan called on the United Nations and its Member States “to take decisive
steps to force the aggressor Armenia to comply with international law and bring it to
account” (see here). Regarding the relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey, a 2010
Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Support (see here) governs the
defence cooperation between the two States. It includes that the countries will help
each other if either one invokes its right of self-defense under Article 51 UN Charter.
This cooperation agreement in addition to Azerbaijan’s declarations and calls for
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“decisive steps” strongly indicate that both the declaration and request criteria have
indeed been fulfilled.
Consequently, the existence of Turkey’s right to collective self-defence in the present
conflict is not prima facie unrealistic. However, this does not mean that Turkey’s
actions constitute a lawful exercise of collective self-defence, especially considering
that Article 51 UN Charter sets out additional criteria to this end. Indicatively, Turkey
has disregarded the obligation to immediately report to the Security Council (see
here at 145). Furthermore, Turkey has openly declared that the newest cease-fire
was merely a “temporary solution” and that it would continue to support Azerbaijan
on the battlefield. By violating the cease-fire and not striving for a permanent and
peaceful solution, Turkey exceeded the limits of necessity and proportionality.
The role of the Security Council and the OSCE Minsk Group
Under Article 51 UN Charter self-defence is allowed until the Security Council takes
“measures necessary to maintain international peace and security”. It is questionable
whether the Security Council resolutions and the referral of the conflict to the OSCE
Minsk Group qualify as measures triggering this “until clause”. While the resolutions
are binding under Article 25 UN-Charter (see here at 113), they are not enforceable,
as no reference to Chapter VII was made therein. The Security Council opted for a
referral of the conflict to the OSCE Minsk Group, instead. The OSCE is a regional
organization that operates without a binding treaty. Hence, it has no competence to
impose sanctions. The efforts put forth by the Minsk Group, including the temporary
cease-fire, have shown not to be effective. The crucial question is whether the “until
clause” is triggered once the Security Council takes any action (regardless of its
nature or success) or once it takes effective action under Chapter VII. The text
of Article 51 is open to both interpretations. Considering the drafting history and
the inherent character of the right to self-defence, a narrow interpretation is more
convincing (cf. here with further references). Following the narrow interpretation, the
referral of the conflict to the OSCE was not convincing and that further measures by
the Security Council would have been necessary.
Concerning the legality of mercenaries
Most of all, a worrying question that remains is the implication of Turkey (allegedly)
sending foreign mercenaries to Azerbaijan. According to Armenia, this constitutes
a violation of “numerous international legal norms, which are binding, including for
Azerbaijan and Turkey” (see here). Indeed, under the International Convention
Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, to which
Azerbaijan is a State party (see here), using mercenaries in a conflict is prohibited.
Turkey, on the other hand, is not bound by the said Convention. Under International
Humanitarian Law, mercenaries do not enjoy the status of combatant or prisoner of
war (see here) and using them is not prohibited. Hence, there is no indication that
the use of mercenaries per se constitutes a violation of international law for Turkey.
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